

Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism studies/ Campus
the Hague

Decline and dissolution of Italian terrorism: the case of the Brigade Rosse, 1970-2001

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Factors linked to the movement
Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)
Failing strategy (the outlined route)
Failing organisation
Failing leadership
Needs of the members
Members outgrowing the movement
New generations not attracted
External factors
(Inter)national or local conflict dis-appears/changes
Government: repression
Government: inclusion
Government: reform
Public opinion/ media/ <i>Zeitgeist</i> changes (image worsens)
Attractive competing interpretation
Breakdown of barriers
Social dependency
Psychological dependency
Amount of costs incurred
Group reprisals
Fear of loss of reputation and protection
Fear of marginalisation

Factors contributing to decline and dissolution
(Demant et al., 2008)

CORRIERE DELLA SERA

ATTENTATO TERRORISTICO IN UNA BANCA DEL CENTRO

ORRENDA STRAGE A MILANO Tredici morti e novanta feriti

Una bomba esplosa in un'aula della Banca d'Italia, lunedì 12 dicembre, a Milano. Il fatto è stato l'evento che ha scatenato la più grande strage terroristica in Italia. Gli attentati sono stati perpetrati da un gruppo di terroristi che si sono presentati in Piazza Fontana, in un'aula della Banca d'Italia, e hanno fatto esplodere una bomba che ha ucciso 13 persone e ferito 90.



**Bombing
attack on the
Piazza
Fontana,
12 December
1970**

Incidents and casualties (right and left wing):

- 1969-1982:
 - 4,362 acts of violence against people
 - 6,153 against property
 - 351 deaths, 768 injured
- Number of left wing terrorists in 1978:
 - 700-800 *regolari* (illegals),
 - 10,000 *irregolari* (above ground supporters) and *fiancheggiatori* (sympathizers, incidentally helping out)
- Number of right wing terrorists arrested by the police 1975-1977:
 - 797 (1975),
 - 325 (1976),
 - 62 fugitive in 1977, several hundreds supporters

- First generation: 1970-1974
- Second generation: 1974-1979
- Third generation 1979-1981
- Fourth?

L'albero genealogico delle BR



1970-74

NUCLEO STORICO

- Curcio
- Gallinari
- Moretti
- Cagol
- Ognibene
- Faranda
- Maccari
- Franceschini
- Morucci
- Braghetti

1979-81

BR COLONNA
"Walter Alasia"

Sindacalismo armato*



BR Partito Guerriglia

- Senzani
- Bolognese
- Cotone
- Ligas

sequestri Cirillo e Dozier
omicidi Taliercio e Peci



BR PCC

per il partito combattente***

- Balzerani
- Savasta
- Libera
- Di Lenardo
- Fosso
- Ravalli
- Cappello
- omicidi Hunt, Tarantelli, Conti e Ruffilli

*** *Leninisti ortodossi*: sarà la lotta armata a creare le condizioni per la svolta rivoluzionaria

** *Movimentisti*: campagne a sostegno delle "istanze proletarie" per radicare il partito fra le masse

* *Operaisti*: inserimento diretto nelle lotte operaie



Nuove BR
NCC PCC


- Liocce
- Galesi
- Fuccini
- Matteini
- Banelli
- omicidi Biagi D'Antona

BR
UCC

unione dei comunisti combattenti**

- Locusta
- Maietta
- Gioia
- Colotti
- omicidio Giorgieri

Italy




The Moro abduction
and killing,
16 March – 9 May 1978





Counterterrorism Italian Style 'Fare bella figura?'

- Partisan neglect until 1974
- Free reign for local police
- National emergency in 1978
- Unrestricted deployment of repressive measures and police troops
- After 1978: reintegration and 'reconciliation'



Counterterrorism measures in Italy

1970-1975:

No specific terrorist laws, use of existing Penal Code: Codice Rocco 1925-1926 (until 1989); Legge Scelba 1952;

1975-1976:

First attempts, Legge Reale 1975, Dalla Chiesa & Santorillo's ct-units

1978-1982:

Specific ct-laws, repressive and preventive: Adaptation Legge Reale in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979; Legge 'pentiti' 1978

1980s:

finetuning of the legal instruments: Adaptation of Legge Reale in 1984, 1999 and 2001 (introduction art. 270b); Legge Pisanu 2005



Factors linked to the movement	
Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)	+
Failing strategy (the outlined route)	+++
Failing organisation	+
Failing leadership	+
Needs of the members	
Members outgrowing the movement	+
New generations not attracted	+++
External factors	
(Inter)national or local conflict dis-appears/changes	+++
Government: repression	+++
Government: inclusion	+++
Government: reform	+
Public opinion/ media/ <i>Zeitgeist</i> changes (image worsens)	+++
Attractive competing interpretation	+
Breakdown of barriers	
Social dependency	0
Psychological dependency	0
Amount of costs incurred	+++
Group reprisals	++
Fear of loss of reputation and protection	+++
Fear of marginalisation	0

NSIGLIO UNITARIO DI ZONA

ASTICIONE

AGOSTO/AGOSTO 80

GLI STESSI

ASSASSINI



Policy angles?

- Terrorism is communication: counterterrorism too: but who is your target audience?
- Don't support spread of injustice frames with new signifiers (repression, abuse, torture)
- Initiate flexible, intelligence led and reformist measures: undermining the legitimacy of the terrorists, targeting leaders, stirring unrest by offering amnesty
- Opening up the political system: reformist approaches, integration of alienated constituencies

